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An Examination of Reinsurers’ Associations in Underlying
Claims: The Iron Fist in the Velvet Glove?
LOUIS TORCH*
I. INTRODUCTION
The onslaught of environmental and asbestos claims coupled with the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and their deleterious effects on the commercial property reinsurance industry, has left insurers and reinsurers reeling.1 This article submits that the iron fist in the velvet glove has replaced the once gentlemanly handshake that cemented contractual relations between cedent and reinsurer. The case law reveals that
both cedent and reinsurer share the blame for this markedly adversarial
shift. As the cases in this article demonstrate, cedents bear responsibility
for shortcomings in their underwriting and claims handling, and reinsurers
have often earnestly sought to avoid settlements even when clearly at fault.
The laws that govern the relationship between reinsurers and the cedants who they reinsure must keep pace with the evolutionary changes that
take place between these parties. For example, have the courts’ analyses of
doctrines such as “attorney-client privilege,” “work-product,” “common
interest,” and “follow the fortunes” and its progeny, kept pace with the
increased adversarial tenor between these two mutually dependent parties?
This begs the question whether a reinsurer genuinely shares a common
* Mr. Louis Torch is currently an Associate with McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte and
Carruth and practices in its Insurance Coverage and Bad Faith Practice Group. Mr. Torch received his
L.L.M. in Insurance Law from the University of Connecticut School of Law, his J.D. and Masters in
Labor and Industrial Relations from the University of Illinois College of Law and University of Illinois
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. Further, Mr. Torch worked as a law clerk to the Chief
Justice of the Nevada Supreme Court before moving to private practice.
1. The vast majority of newly filed asbestos litigation claims, which constitute a huge expense for
insurers, are by people who have not exhibited medical symptoms; hence, they are aptly titled “unimpaired claims.” In fact, Equitas is appealing a California court decision which ruled that Equitas and
other U.S. and London insurers were obligated to pay upwards of US $188 million for possible future
asbestos claims not yet filed. Richard Banks, Hatch is Closed, but Michigan’s Doors Open: The Push
for Asbestosis Reform, 1444 Insurance Day 11 (Sept. 18, 2003); see also Thomas Cunningham, London
Market Documentation Requirements for Asbestos Claims: Reinsurance Contract Implications, 9 2001
Reinsurance Law Report (newsletter of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P.) 1, 10 (Winter 2001)
(available at http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/RLR.pdf) (discussing new documentation and
claim procedure requirements in handling asbestos claims); Neil H. Wyland & Jonathan I. Katz, As the
Dust Settles: Emerging Issues in the Wake of September 11, 9 2001 Reinsurance Law Report (newsletter of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P.) 1, 2 (Winter 2001) (available at http://www.sidley
.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/RLR.pdf) (noting that the September 11 terrorist attacks will be the largest
insured loss in insurance history).
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goal with its cedent. Perhaps it is more accurate to say, first and foremost,
a reinsurer strives to avoid a settlement with its cedent rather than to cooperate with the cedent in denying the underlying claim.
In some contexts, past payment methodologies by reinsurers have
fallen by the wayside. For example, Scott Moser, a recently appointed
executive at Equitas, the specialty fund vehicle that Lloyd’s established to
administer and reinsure pre-1993 London syndicate liabilities, has changed
its approach towards resolving asbestos claims. At one press report, Moser
stated:
[T]here previously was a belief that if asbestos claims were settled
with ‘swift small payment’ the problem would disappear and
costly court battles could be avoided. But because of the significant increase in the number of claims in the past few years, that
theory has been abandoned.2
Thus, the frequency and costs associated with reinsurance claims have
forced cedents, reinsurers and the judiciary to reexamine centuries-old doctrines that often proved ill equipped to deal with this new battleground.
Excess and umbrella carriers have invoked contract provisions such as the
right to associate in the area of direct insurance to ensure that the parties
were obligated to pay the underlying claim. Today, reinsurers have made
use of this contract provision to gain access to information to support their
arguments for avoiding reinsurance settlements. This article examines how
reinsurers use different contract provisions and doctrines either 1) to align
themselves with their cedents to defeat or minimize the costs of underlying
claims, or 2) as a shield and sword against the cedent to prevent indemnifying the cedent for its losses.
II. THE MECHANICS OF A REINSURER’S INVOLVEMENT:
COMING TO THE DANCE
A. Notice
A ceding company’s notice of an impending claim to its reinsurer becomes the springboard for the reinsurer’s right to associate in the defense
of that claim. As discussed in greater detail below, the timing of the notice
by the ceding company to its reinsurer can influence the relationship between the parties. Timely notice may yield cooperation between a cedent
and its reinsurer. Accordingly, untimely notice may trigger a combative
2. Cunningham, supra n. 1, at 10.
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relationship between a cedent and its reinsurer, should the reinsurer exercise its right to associate in the defense of any underlying claim. Most
modern reinsurance contracts, particularly quota share, excess of loss and
facultative contracts typically include a notice requirement that may take
several forms.3
A typical notice clause may require that “[p]rompt notice shall be
given by the [ceding insurer] to the Underwriting Managers on behalf of
the Reinsurers of any occurrence or accident which appears likely to involve this reinsurance.”4 In addition to informing the reinsurer of a claim
or loss, the notice provision, more importantly, allows the reinsurer to set
adequate reserves and decide whether to associate in the defense of a
claim. The provision further aids in helping the reinsurer determine
whether to renew reinsurance coverage and how to set the appropriate price
for future coverage.5 Nevertheless, the advent of asbestos and environmental liabilities have increased the tension between ceding companies and
their reinsurers. This tension is due, in part, to long-tail exposures that
make it more difficult for ceding companies to accurately assess the date of
loss and breadth of the claim. This predicament ultimately clouds which
reinsurer the ceding company should notify and when to give notice.6
Oftentimes, the financial stakes are so huge that the handshake, which
traditionally finalized agreements between cedents and reinsurers, has
come under increased scrutiny by reinsurers. Reinsurers have increasingly
sought to deny reinsurance claims. A reinsurer’s right to associate in the
defense of an underlying claim is an important albeit rarely exercised right.
This right to associate can profoundly impact a reinsurer’s financial obligations to the cedent.7 Late notice and disputes over the timing of notice
have become pivotal arguments raised by reinsurers in denying cedents’
claims.8 Ever mindful of the symbiotic relationship between the cedent
and the reinsurer, and the concomitant trust placed in the cedent, the Second Circuit stressed the importance of notice provisions when it noted:

3. See e.g. C. E. Golding, The Law and Practice of Reinsurance 235, 248, 260 (5th ed., Witherby’s
Publg. 1987) (providing examples of varying notice requirements); Graydon S. Staring, Law of Reinsurance § 17:1 (West 2004) (available at WL, REINSUR database) (discussing different notice requirements).
4. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 4 F.3d 1049, 1065 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Unigard III] (considering whether cedent provided proper notice when it informed its reinsurers that it
had entered into the Wellington Agreement).
5. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1065; Barry R. Ostrager & Mary Kay Vyskocil, Modern Reinsurance Law
and Practice § 1-15 (2d ed., Glasser LegalWorks 2000).
6. James H. Foster, Late Notice of Reinsurance Claims, 29 Tort & Ins. L.J. 773, 773 (1994).
7. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 17:1[4].
8. Foster, supra n. 6, at 773.
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Indeed, reinsurers are so dependent upon ceding insurers for information that application of a cannon construing the reinsurance
contract against the reinsurer would be highly anomalous . . .
Prompt notice provisions in reinsurance are designed to: (i) apprise
the reinsurer of potential liabilities to enable it to set reserves; (ii)
enable the reinsurer to associate in the defense and control underlying claims; and (iii) assist the reinsurer in determining whether
and at what price to renew reinsurance coverage.9
For the reasons set forth above, courts typically give reinsurers great
latitude to inspect its cedent’s records relating to any claims under the reinsurance policy. Under general principles of contract law and the associated
doctrines confined to the reinsured-reinsurer relationship, any failure by
the cedent to make such records available for inspection may relieve the
reinsurer of its obligation to indemnify its reinsured.10
The court in Unigard Security Insurance Co., Inc. v. North River Insurance Co. noted that
a provision that requires notice when it “appears likely to involve
th[e] reinsurance,” does not require a “probability—much less a
certainty—that the policy at issue will be involved. . . . All that is
required is a ‘reasonable possibility’ of such happening, based on
an objective assessment of the information available.”11
Even though most jurisprudence involves direct insurance, several reinsurance cases provide guidance in gauging emerging trends.
B. Prejudice as a Requirement for Untimely Notice
Two views prevail as to whether prejudice is presumed for untimely
notice. At issue is whether a breach of the notice clause bars recovery ab9. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1065 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Delta Holdings v. Nat.
Distillers, 945 F.2d 1226, 1229 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the concerns that insurance and reinsurance
markets have for determining risks to set premiums).
10. Jeffrey S. Burman, Confidential Insurer-Reinsurer Communications: Are Courts Placing the
Reinsurance Relationship in Jeopardy by Ordering Disclosure?, 27 Rutgers L.J. 727, 734 (1996).
11. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1065 (interpreting its ruling in Christiania Gen. Ins. Corp. of N.Y. v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 276 (2d Cir. 1992), to require notice within a reasonable time). A brief
procedural history untangles this confusing course of litigation. In the first case, brought before the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N.
River Ins. Co., 762 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court ruled against reinsurer, North River’s late
notice defense to indemnifying third-layer excess insurer, Unigard, for losses it paid on asbestos claims
because North River had not been prejudiced by Unigard’s late notice. North River then appealed, see
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1991), and the Second Circuit
then certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals. The discussion that follows in part II(B)
provides a summary of the litigation that followed.
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sent a showing that the insurer (or reinsurer, in this case) has been prejudiced.12 Prejudice is presumed under the traditional view whereas a modern view has emerged which requires a showing of prejudice.13 Further,
courts may view this issue differently in the direct insurance context as
opposed to the reinsurance arena. Unigard III shows an interesting distinction between how direct insurance and reinsurance regard prejudice. For
jurisdictions that do not require a showing of prejudice in the context of
direct insurance, the opposite holds true in the reinsurance context.
The pivotal Unigard III case represents the emerging trend in those jurisdictions that require a showing of prejudice in the reinsurance context.
Applying New York law, the court considered whether the cedent, North
River, was obligated to notify its reinsurer, Unigard Security Insurance
Company, that it had signed an intercompany agreement formed between
producers of asbestos and insurers to resolve mounting claims from the
deleterious effects of asbestos (the Wellington Agreement). Finalized in
1985, the parties had crafted terms and conditions and agreed that all disputes would be settled via alternative dispute resolution. The Wellington
Agreement also stipulated how losses and limits would be paid. The Asbestos Claims Facility (a third party administrator) handled the administration of the claims. Unigard claimed that it was unaware that cedent, North
River, had joined the Wellington Agreement, and therefore, it should not
be liable for related claims. Unigard lost at the trial court level and on appeal the Second Circuit recognized that notice was an important issue and
held that the cedent should have given notice that it had joined the Wellington Agreement. Nevertheless, the court found that the cedent did not
act in bad faith, and Unigard, the reinsurer, failed to meet the prejudice
standard required for the reinsurer to prevail.
In reaching its decision, Unigard III certified the following question to
the New York Court of Appeals: “Must a reinsurer prove prejudice before
it can successfully invoke the defense of late notice of loss by the reinsured?”14 The New York Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative
and held that the defense of late notice required a showing of lack of notice
12. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 17:1[4].
13. Ostrager, supra n. 5, at § 8.03[a].
14. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1063. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. N.
River Ins. Co., determined that the question presented was merited given the split of authority in two
federal cases in the Southern District of New York and because its resolution would aid the reinsurance
industry in general as well as New York purchasers and sellers of reinsurance. 949 F.2d at 632. Compare Christiania Gen. Ins. Corp. of N.Y. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 745 F. Supp. 150, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that a reinsurer must prove prejudice on a late notice claim) with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Buffalo
Reinsurance Co., 735 F. Supp. 492, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated in part, 739 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that a reinsurer need not prove prejudice but vacating the grant of summary judgment
on grounds that a question of fact existed regarding reasonableness of two and a half month delay in
providing notice).
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plus harm.15 As discussed in greater detail below, regarding the judiciary’s
views on differences between insurers and reinsurers with respect to notice
provisions, the New York Court of Appeals commented:
A reinsurer is not responsible for providing a defense, for investigating the claim or for attempting to get control of the claim in order to effect an early settlement. Unlike a primary insurer, it may
not be held liable to the insured for a breach of these duties. Settlements, as well as the investigation and defense of claims are the
sole responsibility of the primary insurer; and settlements made by
the primary insurer are, by express terms of the reinsurance certificate, binding on the reinsurer. Thus, failure to give the required
prompt notice is of substantially less significance for a reinsurer
than for a primary insurer.16
Drawing from the New York Court of Appeals’ opinion, in response to
the Appellate Court’s certified question, Unigard III gave an extensive
reasoned opinion for distinguishing direct insurers and reinsurers with respect to the importance of giving notice. Central to the court’s rationale
for requiring strict adherence to providing timely notice stems from the
duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts. Perhaps, more
importantly, the court pointed to the unique relationship ascribed to the
cedent and reinsurer as being one of utmost good faith or uberimae fides.17
Thus, in the context of providing notice, a cedent’s failure to provide
timely and full disclosure would create an undue burden on reinsurers because the reinsurer would incur the administrative and actuarial claims
handling responsibilities normally borne by the cedent. Accordingly, either reinsurance would become unavailable or premiums would escalate.18
C. Notice as a Condition Precedent and the Requirement for a Showing of
Prejudice
The underlying issue is whether, given the presence of a notice clause,
notice is a condition precedent to a reinsured’s right to enforce a contract.19
Whereas reinsurers must generally show prejudice for late notice, direct
15. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 594 N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. 1992). For a further
discussion see infra pt. II(F).
16. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 574 (footnote omitted).
17. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1066, 1069 (discussing the conflicting opinions regarding characterizing
contemporary reinsurance contracts as one of utmost good faith but holding that the proper standard to
determine bad faith is gross negligence or recklessness).
18. See id. at 1054 (discussing the reinsurance industries reliance on good faith information sharing
to determine premiums).
19. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 17:1[1].
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insurers need not follow suit. Nevertheless, lessons learned suggest that
direct insurers must notify their reinsurers if the reinsurers will be encumbered. Courts have employed different standards of notice for reinsurers
and direct insurers.
Courts generally employ a rational process when considering reinsurance issues, and specifically, late notice. First, when addressing reinsurance issues, courts typically turn to the relevant state’s law in the arena of
direct insurance.20 Traditionally, courts would determine whether the reinsurance contract explicitly stipulated that notice was a condition precedent
to recovery. Any failure to provide such notice trumped recovery by the
reinsured.21 Alternately, absent a contractual provision that made notice a
condition precedent, courts have considered whether the cedent’s late notice prejudiced the reinsurer.22 Recent jurisprudence, however, reveals that
courts generally disfavor viewing notice as a condition precedent and instead focus on the second prong – whether the reinsurer was prejudiced.23
The underlying driver for determining whether a direct insurer would
suffer prejudice stems from the direct insurer’s requisite claims handling
responsibilities. For example, untimely notice from an insured party to the
direct insurer could lead to the direct insurer’s inability to forge a competent defense to the claims raised by the insured. This time lag can cause
deleterious effects on crucial evidence, possibly amounting to fraud.24
Conversely, many courts view the presumption of prejudice inapplicable in
the context of reinsurance because reinsurers, unlike direct insurers, do not
have a duty to investigate and defend claims.25
D. Notice as a Condition Precedent – A Historical Perspective
The genesis of jurisprudence considering whether notice is a condition
precedent to a cedent’s recovery emerged in Keehn v. Excess Insurance
Co. of America,26 an older leading case following Illinois’ direct insurance
jurisprudence. The trial court held that notwithstanding the absence of an
explicit provision stating that notice constituted a condition precedent; the
insured’s late notice prejudiced the reinsurer.27 The breach severed the
reinsurer’s right and opportunity to associate in defense of the claim as set
20. Foster, supra n. 6, at 774.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 293 N.E.2d 76 (N.Y. 1972)
(holding that a delay of notice for nineteen months could not be excused).
25. Ostrager, supra n. 5, at § 8.03[b].
26. 129 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1942).
27. Id. at 505.
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forth in the claims cooperation clause. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals noted, “[t]he right was provided by the terms of the contract and we are of the view that the deprivation of such right would constitute prejudice without any actual proof that the results of the litigation
would have been different.”28
One court rejected any distinction between direct insurance and reinsurance under Massachusetts and Texas law, when it held that prompt notice is a condition precedent. Further, that court opined that “such distinction would be strained at best, in that the notice provisions in both contracts serve the same purpose: to afford a company which may be ultimately liable on a claim the opportunity to participate in the defense of that
claim.”29
A line of older cases requires that in the absence of an explicit clause
which makes notice a condition precedent to a ceding insurer’s ability to
recover, reinsurers must show prejudice before avoiding payment.30 Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., an oft-cited case touting
this approach, reinforces the need to draft precise language clearly requiring notice as a condition precedent:
We do not believe this language plainly states a condition precedent. It is significant, in a contract as carefully drawn as an insurance contract, that none of the usual words indicating a condition
precedent are present. Perhaps more significant is the inclusion of
language expressly designating compliance with another contract
clause a condition precedent. The arbitration clause states, ‘(A)s a
condition precedent to any right of action hereunder, the parties to
this agreement shall submit the matter in dispute to arbitration.’
Certainly the omission of similar language from the notice clause
is some indication it was not considered a condition precedent.31
Perhaps precise contract drafting requires the magic buzzwords “as a
condition precedent” in order for reinsurers to foist a late notice argument
on its reinsured.32 This author submits that reinsurance contracts do not
carry the same precision as that of a direct insurance contract – especially
in reinsurance treaties and to a lesser extent in facultative arrangements.
28. Id. (discussing facts related to automotive reinsurance); accord Illinois Judge: Reinsurance
Recovery Barred by Late Notice, 6-18 Mealey’s Litig. Rep. Reinsurance 1 (1996) (discussing Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Const. Reinsurance Corp., No. 91 L 14732, (Ill. Cir. 1995), as applied to liability reinsurance).
29. Highlands Ins. Co. v. Employers’ Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 169, 173 (E.D. La. 1980)
(addressing liability reinsurance).
30. Foster, supra n. 6, at 776.
31. Sec. Mutual Cas. Co. of N.Y, v. Century Cas. Co., 531 F.2d 974, 977 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976) (emphasis added and citation omitted).
32. Id.
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Thus, hypertechnical arguments that a reinsurer did not intend to require
notice as a condition precedent by failing to include the magic words are
misplaced. Additionally, these arguments are further disproved by the fact
that prompt notice plays such a key role in a reinsurer’s right to associate
in setting reserves and so forth.
E. Recent Case Law
Recent case law has continued to shape the contours of late notice. In
1990, Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. Associated International Insurance Co. noted that, “under California law, contractual provisions are not deemed to be conditions precedent unless stated ‘in conspicuous, unambiguous, and unequivocal language.’ ”33 The court also noted
that under California law, there is no presumption of prejudice, rather
under California case law, the only prejudice sufficient to allow an
insurer to avoid liability based on late notice is found in those
cases where the insurer actually demonstrated that there was a substantial likelihood that it could have either defeated the underlying
claim against its insured, or settled the case for a smaller sum than
that for which its insured ultimately settled the claim.34
Whereas, in ruling favorably for the reinsurer, instead of relying solely
on the presence of condition precedent contractual language, the lower
court tied its holding to the presence of a right to associate clause in the
reinsurance contract. The Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled in favor of the
cedent and in so doing held “a reinsurer, must show actual and substantial
prejudice to maintain a late notice defense against . . . its reinsured.”35
One commentator has noted that the Ninth Circuit provided two significant comments despite the opinion’s unfavorable tenor towards reinsurers. First, the court holds insurance companies to a higher standard of review than lay insureds when complying with notice clauses. Second, the
court embraced an objective standard for measuring when a ceding company must notify the reinsurer.36 Under an objective standard, the cedent

33. 922 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing to Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 513
P.2d 353, 357 (Cal. 1973)).
34. Id.; see N.W. Title Sec. Co. v. Flack, 85 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1970) (insurer
did not demonstrate prejudice); see also Trustees of Univ. of Pa. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 890,
899 (3d Cir. 1987) (“prejudice requires a showing that the lateness of notice probably altered the result”).
35. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 922 F.2d at 518-19.
36. Foster, supra n. 6, at 779.
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“has the obligation, implied by law, to perform its duty under the reinsurance contract ‘with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness.’ ”37
F. Notice and the Right to Associate
The Christiania General Insurance Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co. court poignantly stated:
If the only purpose of notice was to enable a reinsurer to decide
whether to associate, the notice clause would be redundant because
notice is a necessary concomitant of the reinsurer’s right to associate. Notice is designed to do more than enable the reinsurer to decide whether it should associate in the defense of a particular suit.38
Nevertheless, according to the court in Unigard III, simply losing the
right to associate in the defense of claims is not enough.39 Clearly the
court relied heavily on the New York Court of Appeals’ reasoning:
Unigard asserts, however, that a reinsurer’s “right to associate”
with the ceding insurance company makes it necessary for the reinsurer to have prompt notification of any claim likely to involve
the reinsurance. The “right to associate” involves the right to consult with and advise the reinsured in its handling of a claim. Unigard argues that this right gives it an interest similar to that of a
primary insurer and that it, therefore, must have early notice so that
it may itself investigate the claim and foreclose the possibility of
fraud. We agree that there are cases in which the reinsure’s right
to associate may be impaired by late notice from the reinsured.
Nonetheless, because of the critical distinctions between a primary
insurer’s right to control the investigation and defense of a claim
and a reinsurer’s “right of association” with the ceding companies,
we cannot agree with Unigard’s contention that the risk of such
impairment is sufficiently grave to warrant applying a presumption
of prejudice. Accordingly, there is no sound reason to depart from
the general contract law principle that a breach will excuse performance only if it is material or demonstrably prejudicial. Indeed,
it has been noted that reinsurers seldom have occasion to exercise
their right to associate.40
37. Ins. Co. of State of Pa., 922 F.2d at 521 (citations omitted).
38. 979 F.2d at 277.
39. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1068-69.
40. Unigard, 594 N.E.2d at 575 (footnote omitted) (citing Christiana Gen. Ins. Corp., 745 F. Supp
at 159; Travelers Ins. Co. v Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 735 F. Supp. 492, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
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In setting the standard for what constitutes prejudice, the court concluded that there must also be economic injury.41 Despite the fact that in
Unigard III, the Court of Appeals concluded that “[n]otice was required
because the signing of the Wellington Agreement substantially altered the
terms of the reinsurance certificate,”42 the court went on to hold that Unigard’s inability to bear its burden in demonstrating that it suffered tangible
economic injury due to North River’s failure to give timely notice that it
signed the Wellington Agreement resulted in Unigard’s failure to prevail.43
Also, in determining whether sufficient notice was provided, courts
have grappled with the time when the cedent notified the reinsurer. For
example, in Insurance Company of Ireland Ltd. v. Mead Reinsurance
Corp.44 the court determined what constituted notice by first examining the
wording of the notice clause. The clause stipulated that the cedent must
provide notice when “any claim and any subsequent developments pertaining thereto which, in the opinion of the company, may involve the reinsurance hereunder.”45 The court acknowledged that the contract wording was
subjective, wherein the insurer must reasonably believe or “opine” that the
claim may trigger a reinsurer’s involvement. Still the court held that the
subjective wording alone would not vest “unfettered discretion” in the insurer to determine when a claim is likely to invoke the reinsurers.46 Citing
Travelers v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., the court noted,
[s]uch a reading would effectively insulate the insurer from its
contractual duty to provide timely notice, as it could simply allege
a failure to perceive the likelihood of a claim involving the reinsurance.47
G. The Claims Cooperation Clause and the Common Interest Doctrine
The general tenor of a claims cooperation clause in a reinsurance
agreement typically obligates the parties to fully cooperate with each other
in the defense of claims. More importantly, this clause gives the reinsurer,
at its own expense, the right to associate in the defense of the underlying
claim.48 Claims cooperation clauses may be combined with loss settlement
41. Id.
42. Unigard III, 4 F.3d at 1066.
43. Id. at 1069.
44. 1994 WL 605987 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
45. Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at *6 (relying on the court’s previous treatment of similarly worded clauses in Travelers, 735
F. Supp. at 500-01).
47. Id.
48. Ostrager, supra n. 5, at § 6.02; Staring, supra n. 3, at § 17:2[3].
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clauses or, may stand alone.49 Further, claims cooperation clauses, in
many respects, accord equal footing with notice clauses given the fact that
late notice may thwart a reinsurer’s opportunity to associate in the defense;
therefore, a reinsurer may claim prejudice.50
Issues of late notice and whether the reinsurer becomes prejudiced by
late notice are closely aligned with the parties’ respective obligations under
a claims cooperation clause. The most notable obligation being the obligation to completely cooperate in the defense of the underlying claims. This
clause carries special significance given the deleterious effects on a reinsurer’s inability to participate in the defense of an underlying claim should
the cedent fail to notify the reinsurer promptly.51 Thus, whereas notice and
claims cooperation clauses bear many critical similarities, a claims cooperation clause can run counter to a “follow the forms” clause, “follow settlements” clause, or “loss settlements” clause.
A “follow the forms” clause should not be confused with a “follow the
fortunes” clause or a “follow the settlements” clause. A “follow the fortunes” clause is broader than the “follow the forms” clause and prevents
reinsurers from second-guessing good faith settlements and obtaining de
novo review of judgments of the reinsurer’s liability to its policy holder.52
A “follow the fortunes” clause also goes beyond settlements, thereby protecting the underlying claim resolution. A typical clause reads as follows:
All claims involving this reinsurance, when settled by the Company, shall be binding on the Reinsurer, which shall be bound to
pay its proportion of such settlements, and in addition thereto, in
the ratio that the Reinsurer’s loss payment bears to the Company’s
gross loss payment, its proportion of expenses . . . incurred by the
Company in the investigation and settlement of claims or suits.53
A “following fortunes” clause, unlike a “following settlement” clause
describes the fundamental relationship between a reinsured and its reinsurer. In treaty insurance, the reinsurer relies on the insured’s utmost good
faith in handling underlying claims.54 Conversely, a facultative agreement
49. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 17:2; see e.g. Michael Cass, Quota Share, in Reinsurance Contract
Wording 111, 131 (Robert W. Strain ed., 3d ed., 1996); Richard M. Shaw, Casualty Excess of Loss, in
Reinsurance Contract Wording 271, 348 (Robert W. Strain ed., 3d ed., 1996).
50. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 17:2.
51. Id.
52. See generally William C. Hoffman, Common Law of Reinsurance Loss Settlement Clauses: A
Comparative Analysis of the Judicial Rule Enforcing the Reinsurer’s Contractual Obligation to Indemnify the Reinsured for Settlements, 28 Tort & Ins. L.J. 659, 659-60 (1993); N. River Ins. Co. v. Phila.
Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.J. 1992) [hereinafter N. River (Phila.)].
53. Bellefonte Reinsurance Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 903 F.2d 910, 911 (2d Cir. 1990).
54. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 18:1.
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offers the reinsurer a greater opportunity to analyze the underlying policy
before assuming the risk. Typically worded “follow the fortunes” clauses
“expound the congruence of coverage in detail and say nothing about settlements, while following settlement clauses, by contrast, deal with an obligation of the reinsurer to accept the reinsured’s judgments of particular
claims.”55 Further, both “follow the settlements” clauses and “following
settlements” clauses contractually obligate the reinsurer to accept and pay
the reinsured’s settlements or judgments.56
One can readily see the conflict between a “follow the fortunes” clause
(or variant thereof) and a claims cooperation clause (or other such clauses
which grant a reinsurer control over settlements by inserting contract language which conveys such rights to the reinsurer).57 Further, combining
the two clauses may create an ambiguity in the contract language. To illustrate, the “follow the fortunes” doctrine dictates that a reinsurer must follow its cedent’s underwriting fortunes and severely restricts the reinsurer to
challenge the cedent’s good faith claims.58 Additionally, this doctrine
“burdens the reinsurer with those risks which the direct insurer bears under
the direct insurer’s policy covering the original insured.”59 Insurance Co.
of Africa v. SCOR (U.K.) Reinsurance Co. Ltd., is a leading English case,
which illustrates such tension and conflict.60
In Insurance Co. of Africa, a warehouse, which was reinsured in the
London reinsurance market, was leased from the Liberian government and
burned down. The warehouse was insured for $3,500,000 and 98.6% of
that amount was reinsured. The reinsurance contract had a typical “follow
the settlements” clause which provided inter alia: “Being a Reinsurance of
and warranted same . . . terms and conditions as and to follow the settlements of the Insurance Company of Africa . . .”61 In addition to the settlements clause, a condition precedent in the policy stipulated that:

55. Id.
56. Id.; see also Hill v. Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co., [1995] LRLR 160, 187 (Ct. App. 1994)
(“[o]ne well-established legal meaning is synonymous with compromise; another is synonymous with
payment”), rev’d on other grounds, Hill v. Mercantile & Gen. Reinsurance Co., [1996] LRLR 341 (H.
Lords. 1996) (discussing war risk reinsurance).
57. See Staring, supra n. 3, at § 18.1 (explaining and distinguishing “following the settlements”
clause); see e.g. Mass: Superior Court London Reinsurers Not Liable Under Treaties, 8-22 Mealey’s
Litig. Rep. Reinsurance 3 (1998) (discussing Ruthardt v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, No. 91-7877C
(Mass. Super. 1998), as applied to liability reinsurance – settlement consent not condition precedent
and breach may be excused by prompt notice).
58. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Cologne Reinsurance Co., 552 N.E.2d 139, 140-41 (N.Y.
1990).
59. Bellefonte Reinsurance, 903 F.2d at 912.
60. [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 312 (Ct. App. 1984).
61. Id. at 312.
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[U]nder this Insurance that all claims be notified immediately to
the Underwriters subscribing to this Policy and the Reassured
hereby undertake in arriving at the settlement of any claim, that
they will co-operate with the Reassured Underwriters and that no
settlement shall be made without the approval of the Underwriters
subscribing to this Policy.62
At issue was whether a breach of the claims cooperation clause rendered the “follow settlements” clause inapplicable. Some discussion focused on whether the claims cooperation clause essentially emasculated the
“follow settlements” clause.63 In its majority holding, the Court of Appeal’s Lord Justice Fox succinctly noted:
There is then, on the language of the two clauses, a plain inconsistency between them. The follow settlements clause requires the reinsurers to accept the honest settlements of the insurer arrived at in
a businesslike way. The claims co-operation clause (or, more accurately, the second part of it) requires that the insurers shall not
make settlements without the approval of the reinsurers. It is a
possible view that the two provisions are so much in conflict that
both should be disregarded. But I think that reading the two
clauses together the proper course is to treat the follow settlements
clause as applicable only to such settlements as are approved by
the reinsurers. That does least violence to the language. I agree
that from the point of view of the insurers that really removes the
value of the follow settlements clause but I do not find it possible
to give that clause an effect that disregards the clear wording of the
claims co-operation clause.64
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal recognized that the two clauses contemplated a certain amount of reciprocity between the insured and reinsurer despite the apparent inconsistency and tension between the two
clauses. Claims cooperation, by definition, requires cooperation by at least
two parties. In the instant case, it was incumbent upon the reinsures to
cooperate with the insured in deriving a settlement. According to the
Court of Appeal, the reinsurers’ actions drove a possible settlement to adjudication by withholding its approval and cooperation of the settlement.
The reinsurers thereby ultimately increased the cost of settlement. Had the
reinsurers simply accepted the insured’s claim, final settlement costs would

62. Id. at 318.
63. Id. at 323.
64. Id. at 334.
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have been less.65 Of note, the majority observed that the ruling “effectively emasculates the following settlements clause . . . but it is . . . what
the parties have agreed.”66 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal did not absolve the reinsurers of all liability and required the reinsurers to prove the
claim without the aid of the loss settlements clause.67
Needless to say, careful contract drafting can become outcome determinate and serve to lessen adversarial conflicts between insurers and reinsurers solely by reducing contractual ambiguities and more closely defining each party’s respective obligations. Not unexpectedly, contract clauses
have evolved in both English and American contracts.
The careful drafting of one revised loss settlements clause found in
both English and American contracts has effectively thwarted broad interpretation. The clause states: “All loss settlements . . . including compromise settlements . . . shall be binding . . . providing such settlements are
within the terms and conditions of the original policies . . . and . . . this
Reinsurance.”68 Here the proviso clause ties reinsurer liability to that
stated under the terms and conditions of the original policies. As noted
above, a claims cooperation clause further restricts loss settlements by requiring the reinsurer’s agreement to settlements.
A more stringent restriction on a loss settlements clause may be imposed by a claims cooperation clause requiring the agreement of the reinsurers to settlements. As explained in the above analysis of Insurance Co.
of Africa, where a loss settlement clause collides with a following settlements clause, precise contract drafting can prevent potential adjudications
between the insurer and reinsurer. Conversely, imprecise drafting may
yield increased transaction costs to all parties involved.
H. Audit and Inspection Clauses
Yet another tool in the reinsurer’s arsenal is the audit and inspection
clause. A semblance of reciprocity exists wherein just as an insurer must
have the opportunity to investigate an insured’s claim, a reinsurer should
have the opportunity to avail itself of the right to audit a reinsured’s books,
claims and underwriting files before settling a claim.69 As an added precaution reinsurers must insert such clauses in their facultative contracts to
solidify their right to access their reinsured’s records. Such clauses, how65. Id. at 324.
66. Id. at 331.
67. Id. at 330; see also Staring, supra n. 3, at §§ 17:2[3], 18:6[5] (averring that the clause could still
apply if the parties had approve in principal and then questioned amounts or other terms).
68. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 18:6[5].
69. Id. at § 15:8.
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ever, do not make it open season for reinsurers to conduct “fishing expeditions.” As noted by the court in In re Arbitration of International Surplus
Lines Insurance Co. v People’s Insurance Co. of China, the audit and inspection clause permitted “access to records at ‘reasonable times’ . . . not .
. . access to all of its reinsured’s records at any time.”70 Further, North
River Insurance (Philadelphia) held that the clause does not act as a waiver
of the reinsured’s privileged communications with its counsel.71
This merely reinforces the increased tensions between cedents and reinsurers and illustrates how far their relationship has evolved from the time
when the two parties cemented agreements with a handshake. One commentator noted that despite contract clauses that grant a reinsurer inspection rights, cedents frequently refuse access to their records until such time
as they have first been paid in full.72 Further, cedents often allege their
reinsurer has acted in bad faith when it has not promptly paid requested
claims. In reality, the reinsurer may simply be exercising due diligence in
reviewing the underlying claim before acquiescing.73 Graydon Staring
emphatically notes that “[t]he audit right is so important that . . . when it is
denied or delayed, there should be no question of the right of the reinsurer
to withhold payments until the audit or inspection is granted.”74
III. DISCOVERY AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
When challenging coverage with cedents, reinsurers typically seek
production of privileged materials detailing the underlying dispute between
the policyholders and cedents.75 Reinsurers often use the claims cooperation clause as a springboard for attempts to seek privileged communications – frequently relying on the common interest doctrine as support for
their quest.76 Further, the question arises whether a cedent and its reinsurer
share a common interest once they become embroiled in a legal dispute or
when the reinsurer seeks privileged communications. Depending on the
circumstances and breadth of discovery, cedents seek to avoid producing
certain materials.

70. 1994 WL 502015 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1994).
71. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 367-68, aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds sub
nom. N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194 (3d Cir. 1995).
72. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 15:8.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Ostrager, supra n. 5, at § 15.02(a).
76. Id.
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The touchstone for asserting the attorney-client privilege is obtaining
legal advice.77 As discussed above, the onslaught of environmental liability has strained the insurer-reinsurer relationship and has threatened the
free flow of information that must pass between insurer and reinsurer. One
commentator has noted that the reinsurance industry must develop new
communication methods in order to protect communications from legally
mandated disclosures, without undermining the tenuous relationship between cedent and reinsurer.78
Most discovery rulings stemming from cases based on reinsurerreinsured relationships go unreported. Still, one may glean the general
tenor of the judiciary’s treatment of the different types of discovery issues
that surface.79 For example, attorney-client privilege may frustrate an insured’s attempt to attain communications between its primary insurer and
reinsurer’s outside counsel.80 Above it all, however, inadvertent waiver
looms large should a party fail to protect its work-product and attorneyclient privilege.81
A. Common Interest Doctrine
With respect to coverage disputes between cedents and reinsurers, reinsurers, may use discovery motions to seek privileged material regarding
the underlying contest between the cedent and the underlying insured. In
support of their quest to obtain privileged material, reinsurers often argue
that they share a common interest with the cedent concerning the underlying claim. Therefore, the “common interest doctrine” provides an avenue
for obtaining privileged materials.82 As discusses herein, courts cast a

77. Michael A. Knoerzer, Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, 31-WTR Brief 40,
42 (newsletter of the ABA) (Winter 2002).
78. Ellen K. Burrows & John H. O’Leary, Discovery and Privilege: Protecting Reinsurance Communications in an Uncertain Legal Landscape, Mealey’s Env. Reinsurance Claims Conf. 1999, 299,
301 (1999).
79. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 20:7.
80. Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitt. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 558 A.2d 1091, 1097 (Del. Super. 1989)
(“This Court will follow the ruling of Maryland Casualty Co. (citations omitted) in that National Union
and Travelers shall thereby produce reinsurance agreements and communications with their reinsurers
but not communications with their outside counsel. As to the question of work product under Delaware
Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(3), these plaintiffs may withhold only those materials prepared in
anticipation of litigation.”).
81. See N. River Ins. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 1995 WL 5792 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5 1995) [hereinafter N. River (Columbia)]; see also Disclosure to Reinsurers Waives Privilege, Requires Production
of Documents, 7-15 Mealey’s Litig. Rep. Reinsurance 3 (1996) (reporting on McLean v. Contl. Cas.
Co., No. 95 Civ. 10415 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), which recognized a specific waiver of privilege on several
papers furnished to reinsurer but no resulting broad subject waiver).
82. Staring, supra n. 3, at § 15:02[a].
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jaundiced eye when deciding whether to apply the “common interest doctrine.”
The “common interest doctrine” (known alternately as the “community
of interest doctrine” or “joint defense privilege”) creates an exception to
the rule of waiver.83 Although the doctrine finds its genesis in criminal
law, it has equal application in the civil arena.84 Succinctly stated:
The ‘common interest’ doctrine applies when multiple persons are
represented by the same attorney. In that situation, communications made to the shared attorney to establish a defense strategy
remain privileged as to the rest of the world. The clients may not,
however, later assert the privilege against each other after their interests become adverse.85
Generally, communications subject to attorney-client privilege or
work-product protection are waived.86 The “common interest doctrine”
carves out an exception to the general rule, especially when the multiple
parties who are represented by a single attorney share a common goal.87
Further, the “common interest doctrine” protects parties who have a common legal goal as opposed to a commercial goal.88 When encountering a
common interest argument, courts also examine whether the communication made by the separate parties was designed to further their efforts in
sharing a common goal and whether the privilege has not been waived.89
Initially, when dealing with an underlying claim, both cedent and reinsurer are aligned in the objective to avoid groundless claims and focus only
on those claims that merit compensation. In order to further this objective,
both parties must share facts concerning their current and potential exposure. In the course of this information-sharing period, both parties have
every reason to expect strict confidentiality.90 There is a possibility, however, that a reinsurer may strive to completely avoid a settlement with its
cedent, rather than cooperate with the cedent in denying the underlying
claim. This begs the question whether a reinsurer genuinely shares a
common goal with its cedent. Courts are conflicted as to how to rule on
83. Burrows & O’Leary, supra n. 78, at 303.
84. N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *3.
85. Id.; Abbott Laboratories v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 200 F.R.D. 401, 407 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(discussing the “common interest doctrine”).
86. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3): “[T]he court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation.”
87. Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 401, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
88. Larry P. Schiffer & Stephen M. Kennedy, A Brief Review of Reinsurance Trends in 2000, 11 No.
19 Andrews Ins. Coverage Litig. Rep. 441 (Andrews Publications 2001).
89. U.S. v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
90. Burman, supra n. 10, at 747.
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whether certain communications lose their privileged status when provided
by a cedent to its attorneys.91
As noted above, the “common interest doctrine” comes into the fore
when the same attorney represents multiple persons. In North River
(Philadelphia),92 paraphrasing United States v. Moscony,93 the court stated
“[c]ommunications to an attorney to establish a common defense strategy
are privileged even though the attorney represents another client with some
adverse interests.” In this case, North River, the reinsured, argued that its
reinsurer, CIGNA Reinsurance Company (“CIGNA Re”), must indemnify
North River for costs that it incurred in connection with claims made by its
underlying insured, Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation (“OCF”).
OCF incurred thousands of liability actions during the 1970s and 1980s
from its sales of products containing asbestos. As OCF’s excess insurer,
North River, along with numerous other insurers of asbestos manufacturers, entered into the Wellington Agreement.94 Pursuant to the Wellington
Agreement, unless an issuer’s policy explicitly excluded payment of defense costs, issuers were obligated to pay such costs.95 Given the number
of claims, the Wellington Agreement also enforced a strict scheduling procedure for those who sought to contest claims.
North River and OCF arbitrated their claims and following an extensive six-day evidentiary hearing. The arbitrator ruled that North River
failed to follow the Wellington Agreement’s scheduling procedure and
therefore waived its right to contest paying OCF’s defense costs. Alternately, the arbitrator ruled that, in accordance with the Wellington Agreement, North River was obligated to indemnify OCF unless there existed a
clause in the reinsurance agreement stating otherwise.96 Initially, North
River appealed the alternative dispute resolution decision but abandoned
the appeal shortly thereafter. Accordingly, North River began submitting
claims to CIGNA Re for defense costs that it incurred with OCF.
The issues presented in North River (Philadelphia) typify the emerging
tensions between cedents and reinsurers in today’s post-asbestos and environmental claims arena. On appeal before the U.S. District Court, District
91. Id. at 747-48; see also N. River (Columbia) 1995 WL 5792 at *4 (stating that: “[A]s in the direct
insurance context, the interests of the ceding insurer and the reinsurer may be antagonistic in some
respects and compatible in others. Thus, a common interest cannot be assumed merely on the basis of
the status of the parties.”).
92. 797 F. Supp. at 363. This was a dispute between North River and CIGNA Re.
93. 927 F.2d 742, 753 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); see also Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that it is only when the clients’ interests are
completely adverse that the privilege will be denied); Jack B. Weinstein et. al., Weinstein’s Evidence
vol. 3, § 503.21 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2005).
94. See supra pt. II(A).
95. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 365.
96. Id.
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of New Jersey, CIGNA Re contended that North River’s failure to preserve
its rights by its failure to comply with the Wellington Agreement’s scheduling procedure trumped its obligation to indemnify North River for its
defense costs.97 The central issue facing the District Court was whether
attorney-client communications between North River and its counsel were
discoverable during the alternative dispute resolution proceedings.
CIGNA Re sought discovery of these attorney-client communications to
show that North River should bear its own defense costs because it had
wrongly decided to abandon the arbitration decision appeal. Understandably, North River contended that none of the communications were discoverable.98
As noted in North River (Philadelphia), courts generally recognize the
“common interest doctrine” in the context of the insured/insurer relationship whereby the insurers have either retained or paid for counsel in order
to defeat the underlying claim. In this context, insureds and insurers share
a common interest in defeating the underlying claim. Consequently, courts
recognize that a unified defense to any third party claims against an insurer
require a mutual disclosure of attorney-client communications regarding
underlying facts giving rise to the claim. It is noteworthy, however, that
the privilege does not extend to communications “that relate to an issue of
coverage.”99 This distinction arises “because the interests of the insurer
and its insured with respect to the issue of coverage are always adverse.”100
Unlike the classic common interest example as noted by Professor Wigmore,101 the instant case differed because North River had independently
retained its own counsel without any direction, guidance or control from
CIGNA Re. Nevertheless, CIGNA Re relied heavily on Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co.102 to support its
position for compelling production of attorney-client documents.103
CIGNA Re, in its first issue on appeal, contended that the common interest doctrine entitled it to discover the reinsured’s attorney-client communications. But as the court noted, and this note addresses, unlike cases
between insureds and insurers, there is scant jurisprudence addressing the
application of the common interest doctrine between reinsureds and reinsurers.104 Despite CIGNA Re’s allegations that the reinsured/reinsurer
97. Id. at 366.
98. Id. at 366.
99. Id. at 367 (citing Waste Mgt., Inc. v. Intl. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 336 (Ill.
1991)).
100. Id.
101. See Staring, supra n. 3.
102. 579 N.E.2d at 336.
103. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 367.
104. Id.
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relationship was highly analogous to that of the insured/insurer, the court
nevertheless determined that it need not examine such similarities or differences between the two contexts because the documents at issue were not
discoverable.105 In reaching its decision, the court noted that the case at
hand did not fit neatly within the confines of classic common interest doctrine.106
Not unexpectedly, the court challenged the outer contours of the doctrine and denounced the common interest doctrine when pertaining to the
cedent-reinsurer relationship. The court emphatically proclaimed “the
common interest doctrine is completely unlashed from its moorings in traditional privilege law when it is held broadly to apply in contexts other
than where there is dual representation.”107 Citing Waste Management, the
court deemed that holding overly broad in extending the common interest
doctrine to those instances where an insurer has neither retained an attorney for its insured nor has represented its insured.108 The court reigned in
the common interest doctrine in the context of the reinsured/reinsurer relationship in stating that the following situations must arise before waiving
the attorney-client privilege: (1) dual representation of both parties; (2) the
privilege was otherwise waived; (3) contractually waived; or (4) a party’s
conduct waived the privilege.109
North River (Philadelphia) also illustrates the effect of a claims cooperation clause on the insurer/reinsurer relationship. As a fallback position
to its argument that North River was obligated to produce documents because it had waived its attorney-client privilege pursuant to the common
interest doctrine, CIGNA Re sought document production via the “cooperation clause” in the reinsurance certificates. The clause read as follows:
The company [North River] shall furnish the Reinsurer with a copy
of its policy and all endorsements thereto which in any manner affect this certificate, and shall make available for inspection and
place at the disposal of the Reinsurer at reasonable times any of its

105. Id.
106. By way of illustration, in the insured/insurer construct, when applying the common interest
doctrine to compel production of the insured’s attorney-client communications regarding the underlying claim, the court relied on Professor Wigmore’s succinct example where “[a] communication by A
to X as the common attorney of A and B, who afterwards become party opponents, is not privileged as
between A and B since there was no secrecy between them at the time of communication.” Id. at 366
(citing J. Wigmore on Evidence § 2312, 605-06).
107. Id. at 367.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 367-68.
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records relating to this reinsurance or claims in connection
therewith.110
Here again the court found the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in
Waste Management overly broad. Whereas in Waste Management the
court enforced a broadly worded claims cooperation clause even after the
parties had become adverse, the North River (Philadelphia) court sided
with the holdings of Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.111 and Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp.112 In fact, in denouncing Waste Management, the North River (Philadelphia) court unabashedly quoted Bituminous by declaring “the reasoning of the Illinois
Supreme Court to be fundamentally unsound.”113 In Bituminous, the court
noted “[t]o hold that an insurance policy creates a contractual waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, even when the insurance company later sues the
insured contending the insured’s claim is not covered by the policy, would
completely eviscerate the attorney-client privilege.”114
Accordingly, in North River (Philadelphia) the court ultimately held
that absent explicit language to the contrary, a reinsured does not give up
its right to preserve the confidentiality of communications with its counsel
regarding coverage determinations concerning the underlying claim, notwithstanding the contractual requirements that a claims cooperation clause
may impose.115 The court noted, however, that the reinsured still bears a
duty of being forthright with its reinsurer in handling the underlying claims
and in producing facts or documents in its possession relevant to the underlying claim.116 The court further restricted a reinsured’s requirement to
issue documents pursuant to a claims cooperation clause to those instances
where the reinsured had retained legal advice “with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.”117 The reinsured, however, must treat such documents, from their inception with “a greater degree of secrecy and expectation of confidentiality.”118 Needless to say, reinsureds should heed this
advice in order to bolster their arguments to withhold certain documentation on the eve of a forthcoming documentation request.

110. Id.
111. See Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 416-17 (D. Del. 1992) (rejecting Waste Mgt., 579 N.E.2d at 328).
112. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381 (D. Minn. 1992).
113. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 368 (quoting Bituminous Cas. Corp., 140 F.R.D. at 386).
114. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 140 F.R.D. at 386.
115. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 369.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 369 (quoting language from Carey-Canada, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 118 F.R.D.
250, 251 (D.D.C. 1987)).
118. Id.
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Conversely, whereas the court in North River (Philadelphia) considered its case at bar as one which tread upon the outer reaches of the common interest doctrine and accordingly did not extend the efficacy of the
doctrine under its unique facts, the court in North River (Columbia) noted
that the weight of authority determined that the common interest doctrine
“extend[s] at least to situations ‘where a joint defense effort or strategy has
been decided upon and undertaken by the parties and their respective counsel.’ ”119 According to the court, for the common interest doctrine to attach
the parties must pursue a common legal enterprise notwithstanding having
separate legal counsel.120 North River sought reimbursement from Columbia Casualty for asbestos-related losses incurred by the underlying insured,
OCF, under an excess liability insurance policy it had issued to OCF in
1974.121 Initially, North River submitted that it had no obligation to reimburse OCF, but later agreed to submit the claim to binding arbitration
through an alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) proceeding where an
arbitrator ruled in OCF’s favor and ordered North River to pay OCF’s defense costs. North River appealed and later abandoned the appeal.122
North River then filed suit against eight reinsurers, Columbia Casualty
among them, claiming they each owed a portion of OCF’s defense costs.123
Columbia Casualty argued the excess policy between OCF and North
River did not cover defense costs, and most importantly, North River’s
failure to preserve its rights under the Wellington Agreement trumped any
obligation on Columbia Casualty’s part to pay a share of the defense
costs.124
At issue was Columbia Casualty’s Rule 26(c) motion, which read as
follows:
We need all documents between, among or with respect to Crum &
Forster [North River’s parent company] and its attorneys (including Simpson Thacher & Bartlett) regarding its dispute with
Owens-Corning over North River’s obligation to pay OwensCorning’s attorney’s fees.125
North River countered and argued that attorney-client privilege and
work-product protected the ADR documents from disclosure. In turn, Co119. N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *3 (citing U.S. v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d
Cir. 1989)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at *1.
122. Id.
123. See e.g. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. 363.
124. N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *1.
125. Id. (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides a vehicle for obtaining information from a nonparty).
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lumbia Casualty launched a four-part argument using some of the same
arguments that CIGNA Re had used against North River in North River
(Philadelphia):126 (1) Columbia Casualty claimed it shared a “common
interest” in the subject matter of the ADR documents; (2) that North River
breached its fiduciary duty to Columbia Casualty; (3) with respect to the
ADR, North River placed its good faith conduct in issue; and (4) North
River had acted fraudulently by failing to preserve its rights under the Wellington Agreement and then attempted to fraudulently conceal its attempts
to shift its burden of defense costs to its reinsurers.127
Addressing the first issue, the court noted that the more difficult application of the doctrine question arises when parties have parallel interests
but do not share a common legal strategy.128 Pivotal in determining
whether the doctrine should apply is not whether the parties share similar
interests but whether the parties demonstrate they have cooperated toward
a common legal goal. It is not enough for a court to make such a determination based solely on the relationship of the parties’ because their interests may simultaneously be cooperative and antagonistic.129 The reinsured/reinsurer relationship, the court noted, provides such an example of
conflicting interests. Here the court noted that a reinsurer does not share
the same obligation to defend an underlying insured as a direct insurer.
Therefore, the concomitant obligation to cooperate may not be present.130
In the often cited case, Christiania General, one very strong argument
for cedents in their quest to label communications with its reinsurer as
privileged stems from the fact that
[t]he relationship between a reinsurer and a reinsured is one of utmost good faith, requiring the reinsured to disclose to the reinsurer
all facts that materially affect the risk of which it is aware and of
which the reinsurer itself has no reason to be aware.131
Thus, one can argue that given the fact that disclosure is, for the most part,
involuntary, applying general rules of waiver are inapposite. But as noted
below some recent decisions cast doubt on the vitality of whether the mere
stature of the relationship between insurers and reinsurers shields the parties from disclosing communications between them.132

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. 363.
N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
979 F.2d at 278.
Knoerzer, supra n. 77, at 46.
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In Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc.,133 plaintiff, Allendale Mutual Insurance Company (“Allendale”), the primary insurer, and its parent company, Factory Mutual International (“FMI”),
brought suit against Bull Data Systems, Inc., Zenith D.S. France, S.A., and
ZDS Europe (collectively “the ZDS defendants”). Allendale argued that
the policy it had issued to defendants did not cover a fire that had destroyed a warehouse and its inventory in France. The value of the insured
property was roughly forty-eight million dollars.134 Before the fire Allendale secured reinsurance, retaining 2.5 million and reinsuring 45.5 million.
Pursuant to its reinsurance contracts, Allendale agreed to keep the reinsurers informed regarding the status of defendant’s claim and its ongoing coverage litigation. These communications mainly consisted of letters and
telephone conversations between Allendale’s claims representative and the
reinsurers’ claim representatives.135
The ZDS defendants sought production of these communications, and
Allendale and its reinsurers refused. In defending its objections, Allendale
alleged that the documents were protected by either the work-product doctrine or, alternatively, attorney-client privilege. Allendale further asserted
that it had not waived these privileges when it passed these communications to its reinsurers because the parties had a common interest in the underlying claim.136 In its analysis, the court ruled that neither doctrine,
work-product or attorney-client privilege, applied; therefore, the court
chose not to address the applicability of the common interest doctrine.137
Even if the documents at issue were protected by one of these doctrines,
the court opined that the common interest doctrine in this case was inapposite.138
This ruling did not go unnoticed by one commentator’s ire. In poignantly chastising the court, the commentator observed that “[t]he glaring
defect of the Allendale Mutual court’s statement is its misconception of the
reinsurance relationship. The court failed to examine the true implications
of two parties, the insurer and reinsurer, who are bound by laws of formal
contract and thus share a common legal and commercial interest.”139 This
133. 152 F.R.D. 132 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
134. Id. at 134. Before launching into the opinion, United States Magistrate Judge Bobrick, so eloquently began with the following quote which this author notes bears repeating so as to protect future
groves: “I think that I shall never see / A poem lovely as a tree.” Joyce Kilmer, Trees (1913). In defending this apropos poem, Judge Bobrick further noted, “The amount of paper which has so far been
expended in this lawsuit is indeed impressive, and no doubt many trees have been cut down to advance
the course of this litigation. The court duly notes the sacrifice of those trees in the name of justice.” Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 134-35.
137. Id. at 140.
138. Id.
139. Burman, supra n. 10, at 749-50.
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same commentator also found the Allendale Mutual court’s position on
applying the common interest exception overly restrictive and went so far
as to declare that “[c]ourts refusing to apply the common interest exception
in this area have done so because of their ignorance or naiveté concerning
the business of reinsurance.”140
Other courts are more nuanced than the Allendale Mutual court’s
summarily dismissive approach toward the common interest doctrine when
applied to reinsurance relationships. Noting the similarities and differences of interests between reinsurers and cedents, the court in North River
(Columbia) observed that given these diverging interests “a common interest cannot be assumed merely on the basis of the status of the parties.”141
Further, in ordering an insurance company to produce its correspondence
with its insurer, the court in Reliance Insurance Co. v. American Lintex
found that the insurer-reinsurer relationship alone does not merit raising
attorney-client privilege to bar disclosure.142
B. Whether a Fiduciary Relationship Exists Between Reinsurer and Reinsured
Another ploy advanced by reinsurers is alleging a fiduciary relationship exists with its insured. Turning to Columbia Casualty’s second argument, the court for the most part summarily dismissed its claim that North
River’s alleged fiduciary relationship created an exception to attorneyclient privilege. The court cited the Second Circuit’s pivotal Christiania
General decision:
[Any] characterization of the relationship between a reinsured and
reinsurer as being inevitably fiduciary in nature is one we are unable to adopt. To the contrary, because these contracts are usually
negotiated at arms length by experienced insurance companies,
there is no reason to label the relationship as “fiduciary.”143
In concluding that North River did not owe a fiduciary duty to Columbia to reveal the ADR documents, the court drew on the reasoning of North
River (Philadelphia).144 There the court noted that with respect to facultative reinsurance agreements, “[t]he presence of sufficient influence and

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *4.
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7140 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001).
979 F.2d at 280-81.
See N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 370.

File: Torch-Macroed

2005

Created on: 4/25/2005 12:08:00 PM

THE IRON FIST IN THE VELVET GLOVE

Last Printed: 5/11/2005 12:48:00 PM

357

control over the affairs of another necessary to give rise to fiduciary responsibilities is absent between reinsured and reinsurer.”145
As noted in North River (Philadelphia’s) second footnote, several
courts have opined that a fiduciary duty does not arise between reinsured
and reinsurer, certainly in facultative agreements, but also in treaty agreements. In International Insurance Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
of London the court declared, “[t]here is very little case law discussing
whether an insurer has a fiduciary duty to its reinsurer, and next to nothing
about what that duty entails.”146 Nevertheless, as support for its conclusion, the court in International Insurance drew on the reasoning of International Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.,
where that court upheld its earlier decision and denied the plaintiff’s
amended complaint.147 In its motion to reconsider, the plaintiff, International Surplus Lines Insurance Company (“ISLIC”), had issued to defendant, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (“Fireman’s”), a policy of reinsurance covering Fireman’s primary policy with Dow Chemical Company
and ISLIC argued that Fireman’s breached its warranty by failing to retain
an agreed-upon level of reserved funds as set forth in the reinsurance certificates.148
In one of its arguments, ISLIC alleged that a fiduciary relationship existed between Fireman’s and itself.149 At the first trial the court determined
that, under Illinois law, a fiduciary relationship did not exist between an
insurer and an insured, and the court declined to extend a fiduciary relationship to that of a reinsurer and its reinsured.150 The court looked for
indicia of domination by the party in whom trust was reposed by the other
party and absent evidence of domination or influence on the party placing
this trust, a fiduciary relationship cannot be found to exist. This protects
the dominated party from being abused.151 The court adroitly noted that
despite some courts holding that the duty of utmost good faith may exist
between the reinsurer and its reinsured, this does not in and of itself rise to
the level of constituting a fiduciary duty.152
Thus, following the reasoning set forth by earlier courts in International Insurance, the court proclaimed that, “[m]ost significantly, both
parties to this relationship are experts in the subject around which their
relationship centers. If Illinois courts have not deemed a fiduciary rela145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
1991 WL 349907 at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1991).
1989 WL 165045 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Paskas v. Illini Fed. Savs. & Loan Assn., 440 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1982)).
Id. at *3 (relying on Robacki v. Allstate Co., 468 N.E.2d 1251, 1253 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1984)).
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tionship to exist between an individual policy holder and a sophisticated
insurance company, they are not likely to imply one in a reinsurance relationship.”153
The court in North River (Philadelphia) pointed out that establishing a
fiduciary relationship between a reinsurer and its reinsured is unwarranted;
nevertheless, the reinsurer has a right to associate as an adequate tool to
protect the reinsurer’s interests. In rejecting CIGNA Re’s argument that it
was incumbent upon North River to disclose its attorney-client communications given its fiduciary relationship with CIGNA Re, the court noted:
The presence of sufficient influence and control over the affairs of
another necessary to give rise to fiduciary responsibilities is absent
between reinsured and reinsurer. The reinsurer’s ‘right to associate’ gives it adequate means by which to keep informed of events
that may give rise to coverage under its agreement, and also provides a sufficient means to protect its own interests. Reinsurance
agreements are negotiated at arms-length between equally sophisticated parties. Reinsurers are well aware of the risks inherent in
reinsurance obligations and are adequately situated to protect their
interests.154
Perhaps the following quote best describes the judiciary’s reluctance to
find a fiduciary relationship between a reinsurer and its reinsured: “[M]ost
contractual relationships have opportunities for ordinary cheating without
rendering either or both parties fiduciaries.”155
C. Implied Waiver of Attorney Client Privilege Under the “In Issue” Doctrine
The “in issue” or “at issue” doctrine comes into play “when the party
has asserted a claim or defense that he intends to prove by use of the privileged materials.”156 When raised, the proponent argues that the insured
may not rely upon the doctrines of work-product or attorney-client privilege because the insured has waived the privilege when it places in issue an
otherwise privileged communication.157 Courts are not aligned, however,
in their application.158
153. Id. at *4.
154. N. River (Phila.), 797 F. Supp. at 370.
155. Intl. Ins. Co., 1991 WL 349907 at *21.
156. N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *6 (quoting Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D.
66, 71 (D.N.J. 1992)).
157. Tod Zuckerman & Mark Raskoff, Environmental Insurance Litigation: Law and Practice §
14:10 (West 2004).
158. Id.
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In Christiana General, CIGNA Re asserted the same argument in its
quest to discover withheld documents. There the court also relied on the
reasoning in Remington Arms where the court stated that the “in issue”
doctrine should be construed narrowly. It is only in those instances where
the party places the contents of the privileged communication at issue that
merits an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege.159 Recognizing a
split in authority concerning the appropriate application of the “in issue”
doctrine, the court opined:
The way in which courts have dealt with this type of waiver has
become inconsistent and unnecessarily complicated. If the information is actually required for a truthful resolution of the issue on
which the party has raised by injecting the issue, the party must either waive the attorney-client privilege as to that information or it
should be prevented from using the privileged information to establish the elements of the case.160
Whereas, the Remington Arms court noted that the Connecticut Supreme Court has provided little guidance regarding the proper application
of the in issue doctrine, the court did find guidance from Connecticut’s
lower courts on this issue. For example, in Reichhold Chemicals v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. the court noted that the doctrine could apply in some instances:
Because a plaintiff puts a question ‘at issue’ which would normally
be, as in this case, creating a divergence of claims between the parties who would normally be on the same side, does not in itself
mean that the plaintiff has to give up, blanket-wise, all of the privileges that have been bestowed upon attorneys by our law.161
Here the court essentially reserved the right to determine whether attorneyclient privilege when pressed against the “at issue” doctrine applies to certain documents.

159. Remington Arms, 142 F.R.D at 416 (Applying Connecticut law the U.S. District Court, Delaware, held that in the coverage determination suit that the insurer’s motion to produce documents
relating to the underlying actions against the insured for environmental damage, the insurer was not
entitled to the production of documents because the insured had not waived its attorney-client privilege.).
160. Id. at 415.
161. Reichhold Chems. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., CV-88-0351982, slip op. at 29-33 (Conn.
Super. Feb. 1, 1991).
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D. Claims Cooperation Clauses, Attorney-Client Privilege and WorkProduct
Cooperation clauses are also used to attain privileged documents.
However, the Remington court noted that Connecticut courts explicitly
reject the notion that cooperation clauses could pierce the wall of attorneyclient privilege and work-product privilege in insurance cases.162
Therefore, it appears that courts look for certain indicia before allowing a party to use the common interest doctrine to obtain documents generally protected by attorney client privilege. For the court in North River
(Columbia), the indicia consisted of the following: (1) whether the same
counsel represented the reinsured and reinsurer; (2) whether the reinsurer
contributed to the reinsured’s legal expenses; (3) whether the reinsurer
exercised any control over the proceedings; and (4) whether the parties
coordinated their litigation strategy.163 Absent the presence of the aforementioned indicia, the court found the common interest doctrine did not
apply.
E. Other Cases
In a recent New York intermediate appellate court decision, despite citing several cases that addressed the common interest and work-product
doctrine, the court ruled that Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company and
third-party defendant, Hanover Insurance Company (“the insurers”), had
waived the attorney-client privilege when it transmitted certain documents
to its reinsurer and reinsurance intermediary, Munich Reinsurance Company and Wilcox Incorporated Reinsurance Intermediaries, respectively.164
The appellate court remanded the matter for an in camera review to determine whether the documents constituted work-product.165
As support for its ruling, the court cited Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London.166 In Aetna, a group of London reinsurers sought the return of over 1,300 pages of documents that
they inadvertently produced during discovery to the plaintiff, Aetna, in its
suit seeking reimbursement from the reinsurers for its settlement of a
chemical company’s environmental liability claims.167 Some of the documents contained meeting or workshop summaries of the Environmental
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Remington Arms, 142 F.R.D at 416-17.
N. River (Columbia), 1995 WL 5792 at *5.
Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Stamm, 700 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2000).
Id. at 708.
Id. (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 676 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
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Claims Reinsurance Group (“ECRG”) that were attended by London-based
insurance companies.168 It is noteworthy that in footnote two of the court’s
decision, the court stated, “[t]he court is not aware of any rule that would
require the return of inadvertently produced totally irrelevant material.”169
Accordingly, the court determined that the only question before it was
whether the reinsurers could establish that the documents were relevant
and therefore should not have been produced.170 In its review of the documents, the court acerbically noted the London reinsurers “were seeking to
keep environmental losses on this side of the Atlantic.”171
Recall that, as discussed above, the common interest doctrine protects
parties who have a common legal goal as opposed to a commercial goal.172
In analyzing whether the common interest doctrine attached, thereby protecting the reinsurers’ documents from discovery, the court concluded that
the parties’ common interests were for the most part exclusively commercial in nature.173 The court’s document review revealed that the reinsurers
simply sought to further their commercial interests by maintaining the
London reinsurance market’s viability, to attain new business from its cedents and lastly, to keep “[t]he environmental claims at bay.”174 Thus, the
court decided it would not “apply the ‘common interest’ privilege except
where the underlying circumstances require that communications be protected, as with ordinary attorney-client matters, and the common legal interest impacts potential litigation against all of the participants.”175
On appeal, the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division denied
Lloyd’s of London’s appeal.176 Here again, the court focused on the predominately commercial as opposed to legal nature of the communications.
The court further noted that the parties never indicated that the communications were confidential. With respect to appellant’s argument that the
documents were covered by work-product, the court expounded, “neither
the aforementioned minutes nor the interviewee list were entitled to protection as attorney work product.” The court went on to explain that, “they
were not ‘uniquely the products of a lawyer’s learning and professional
skills.’ ”177
168. Id. at 730.
169. Id. at 729 n. 2.
170. Id. at 729.
171. Id. at 731.
172. See supra pt. II(A); see also Staring, supra n. 3, at § 15:02[a].
173. Aetna, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 692 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. App. Div.
1st Dept. 1999).
177. Id. at 386.
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F. What Conduct Constitutes Waiver of Work-Product or Attorney-Client
Privilege?
It is noteworthy that with respect to the work-product doctrine, some
courts employ a temporal analysis in deciding whether the doctrine governs. For example, some courts require that litigation be imminent while
others only require that the motivating factor for generating the document
was to further future litigation.178
In a 1999 case, an Illinois federal court ruled favorably for a cedent
who inadvertently sent documents to a reinsurer and reinsurance intermediary and then sought to protect these documents from disclosure to its
insureds.179 Fortunately for the cedent, the court concluded that the documents contained attorney work-product that afforded protection from disclosure and rejected the reinsurer’s argument that the cedent waived its
privilege when it mistakenly provided the documents to the reinsurer and
intermediary.180 In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on Allendale Mutual, for its recitation on the common interest doctrine and held
that the documents were protected from disclosure given the fact that a
common interest existed between cedent and reinsurer.181
However, as one commentator notes, whereas the ruling in Minnesota
School Boards may support cedents who share concerns about potential
discoveries of documents by insureds in coverage disputes, good lawyering
warrants consummate care when proffering documents to reinsurers under
the guise that attorney-client privilege or work-product protects the documents. Given the fact that the common interest doctrine does not ubiquitously prevail among all courts, one must carefully review local case
law.182
In an interlocutory appeal, the plaintiff, Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, sought to reverse the trial court’s ruling which required it to
disclose documents pertaining to an insurance coverage dispute with the
defendants, Aetna Casualty, its second level excess liability insurer, regarding the settlement of more than 200,000 underlying actions for personal injuries cause by asbestos exposure.183 The Supreme Court of Connecticut ruled the documents were protected by the attorney-client privi-

178. Schiffer & Kennedy, supra n. 88.
179. Minn. Sch. Bds. Assn. Ins. Trust v. Employer’s Ins. Co. of Wausau, 183 F.R.D. 627, 632 (N.D.
Ill. 1999).
180. Id.
181. Minn. Sch. Bds. Assn. Ins. Trust, 183 F.R.D. at 632 (citing Allendale, 152 F.R.D. at 136-39).
182. Larry P. Schiffer & Stephen M. Kennedy, A Brief Review of Reinsurance Trends in 1999, 4 No.
21 Andrews Intl. Reinsurance Dispute Rep. 3 (Andrews Publications 2000).
183. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 53 (Conn. 1999).
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lege.184 The court declined to address whether the documents were protected by the work-product doctrine.185
In discussing whether the trial court properly ordered disclosure, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, for the first time addressed the “at issue”
exception to the attorney-client privilege in Connecticut and then determined whether, as defendants claimed, it applied to the instant case.186
Recognizing the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege, the court explained that “[b]ecause of the important public policy considerations that
necessitated the creation of the attorney-client privilege, the ‘at issue,’ or
implied waiver, exception is invoked only when the contents of the legal
advice is integral to the outcome of the legal claims of the action.”187
Again, relying on Remington Arms, the court explained that relevant communications relating to underlying actions do not necessarily rise to the
level of placing them at issue – hence, waiver.188 In furthering the need to
protect the public policy considerations upon which the attorney-client
privilege is built, the court declared:
If admitting that one relied on legal advice in making a legal decision put the communications relating to the advice at issue, such
advice would be at issue whenever the legal decision was litigated.
If that were true, the ‘at issue’ doctrine would severely erode the
attorney-client privilege and undermine the public policy considerations upon which it is based.189
Accordingly, the court ruled that the “at issue” doctrine did not apply
because the plaintiff did not rely on the communications to prove that the
underlying settlements were reasonable.190 In its final comment on the
issue, the court cited the seminal Supreme Court case Hickman v. Taylor
where the work-product doctrine had its origin and noted that compelling
disclosure of documents under the guise of the “at issue” doctrine could
chill attorney-client communications and could demoralize the legal profession by weakening its protections.191 Ultimately, the court noted, this
would undermine the cause of justice and the interests of clients.192
184. Id. at 66.
185. Id. at 60 n. 17.
186. Id. at 60.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 61.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 62-63 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)).
192. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 730 A.2d at 57, 63; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without
wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.”).
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In a case of first impression before the U.S. District Court, Kansas,
Employer’s Reinsurance Corp. v. Clarendon National Insurance Co. provides another twist to the attorney client-privilege and work-product doctrines.193 There, the reinsurer, Employer’s Reinsurance Corp. (“Employer’s”) brought suit against its insured, Clarendon National Insurance
Company (“Clarendon”), a provider of non-standard automobile insurance.194 Clarendon had sued its managing general agent who underwrote
and administered nonstandard policies issued by Clarendon for gross negligence and willful misconduct for its claims handling.195 Employer’s, in
turn, filed suit against its insured alleging Clarendon’s managing agent was
reckless and grossly negligent in its claims handling, underwriting and
administration and by extension alleged Clarendon was not only reckless
but also grossly negligent in its supervision of the managing agent.196
During the discovery phase, Clarendon inadvertently produced a fourpage affidavit by an actuary it had retained during its lawsuit against the
managing agent and later realized that the information therein contained
damaging information that merely bolstered its reinsurer’s allegations. Of
note, the actuary placed the notation “ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT” at
the top of the affidavit.197 After receiving this document, Employer’s then
forwarded the affidavit to an expert it had retained to estimate the damages
caused by Clarendon’s misconduct.198 Relying largely on the affidavit, the
expert then deposed an individual apparently employed by Clarendon, who
claimed he did not recognize the document; ultimately, he did not answer
any questions about the document.199 Clarendon’s counsel then notified
Employer’s counsel that the document was privileged, that they produced
it inadvertently, and asked Employer’s to return all copies of the document
and to also strike the deposed testimony relating to it.200 Employer’s did
not acquiesce and Clarendon then sought a court order.201
Determining the actuary’s status became the central issue for the court
because Clarendon argued that the actuary acted as a non-testifying consultant; therefore, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), his work constituted work-product that was not subject to discovery.202 Employer’s
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

213 F.R.D. 422 (D. Kan. 2003).
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 423.
Id. 423-24.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) states:
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claimed that given Clarendon’s failure to demonstrate that the actuary was,
in fact, a non-testifying consultant, that the strictures of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(A) apply, thereby subjecting the affidavit to discovery.203 The
court noted a key distinction between subparts (A) and (B) of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A), the expert designation as a
witness for the party who has retained the expert becomes the touchstone
for whether the adversary may seek discovery. Thus, obtaining discovery
turns on one’s status as a non-testifying or testifying witness; therefore,
one may argue that this creates an opportunity for a party to change the
expert’s status to avoid a discovery request.204 The court correctly pointed
out that Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b) allows discovery of a non-testifying expert’s
facts or opinions only “upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.”205
Further, the general tenor of this rule deals with physical and mental examinations which did not apply to the case at bar.206
The court grappled with what legal standard to apply to protective orders where the documents, for the most part, were generated by a consulting expert as opposed to a testifying expert and then allegedly produced
inadvertently to a party opponent.207 The court recognized that the affidavit, despite the “WORK PRODUCT” adornment at the top of the document, was not accorded the protections of attorney work-product because
an expert, as opposed to an attorney, created the document. Conversely, as
noted in dicta, the court also acknowledged that some courts have deemed
such materials work-product.208
With no cases clearly addressing protective orders seeking the return
of inadvertently produced documents generated by a non-testifying expert,
the court relied on a line of cases in its district where the courts applied a
five-factor test to determine whether inadvertently producing the document
constituted a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work-product.209 The
A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, discover facts known or opinions
held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means.
203. Employer’s Reinsurance Corp., 213 F.R.D at 424. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A) reads as follows:
“A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report from the expert is required under subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition shall
not be conducted until after the report is provides.”
204. Employer’s Reinsurance Corp., 213 F.R.D at 424-25.
205. Id. at 425.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 427 n. 14.
209. Id. at 428.
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court applied the following five factors to settle whether Clarendon waived
its Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)’s protections:210
(1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure;
(2) the time taken to rectify the error;
(3) the scope of the discovery;
(4) the extent of disclosure; and
(5) the overriding issue of fairness.211
The court carefully analyzed each of the five factors. As for first factor, despite some precautions taken by Clarendon to prevent inadvertent
disclosure, the court determined that Clarendon’s failure to proffer the
privilege log to Employer’s in a timely manner constituted a waiver of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)’s protections.212 Given the fact that Clarendon
promptly notified Employer’s that it sought the documents’ return after
discovering the inadvertent disclosure shortly thereafter, the court deemed
this second factor weighed against waiving Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)’s
protections.213 Further, because Clarendon had produced approximately
10,800 pages of documents, the court concluded that when examining the
third factor, the scope of discovery, Clarendon had not waived Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(4)(B)’s protections.214 The court applied a standard set forth in
Zapata v. IBP, Inc. for assessing the extent of disclosure whereby
“[m]eaningful use of the documents disclosed is often sufficient to find
extensive disclosure.”215 Here the court noted that Clarendon produced the
affidavit not only to Employer’s damages expert but to other key personnel
as well. The court, again, however, noted the significance of the
“ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT” heading adorning the top page of the
affidavit.216
Clarendon, however, argued that pursuant to ABA Ethics Opinion 92368, Employer’s was ethically bound to notify Clarendon that it had produced a document bearing the “Work Product” notation and should not
have forwarded this document to its own expert for review.217 Nevertheless, the court was not persuaded that such a designation, coupled with the
210.
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217.

Id. at 424; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
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Id. citing (Zapata, 175 F.R.D. 574, 577 (D. Kan. 1997).
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ABA’s ethical pronouncement, passed muster.218 The court acerbically
noted:
Labels such as “Attorney Client Privilege” and “Attorney Work
Product” are overused on documents that do not truly qualify for
protection. To impose an obligation on opposing counsel to notify
an adversary of every document that is produced during discovery
with such a label is overkill. It would provide an incentive for
commonplace use of these types of labels and would be a wholly
inefficient method to monitor production.219
The court noted that it would be disingenuous for Employer’s to argue
that Clarendon had not met its burden under the fourth factor given the fact
that its attorney had failed to proactively determine whether opposing
counsel had inadvertently produced it. Accordingly, the court determined
that the fourth factor weighed in Clarendon’s favor.220 The standard the
court applied towards the fifth factor, fairness, was whether the document
was relevant. Here the court quickly ascribed the affidavit as relevant to
the litigation and fairness dictated preventing Employer’s from using the
affidavit.221
After balancing all five factors the court concluded that Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4)(B)’s protections trumped production of the affidavit to Employer’s.222
IV. CONCLUSION
In this new landscape littered with the after-effects of long-tail claims
and millions, and oftentimes billions, of dollars at stake, courts must seek
innovative solutions for resolving issues that have arisen as a result of the
dynamic and changing relationships between cedents and reinsurers. For
example, courts must address common interest privilege with a greater
understanding of the relationship between a cedent and its reinsurer.
Courts must stress the need for greater transparency between the cedent
and reinsurer because doing so will ultimately yield lower transaction costs
and hence, greater efficiencies.
For example, let us suppose that courts applied a more liberal approach
toward the common interest doctrine by allowing a more expansive release
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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Id.
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Id.
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of documents. Further, in this hypothetical, imagine a reinsurer seeks
documents from its insured, and as most of the case examples set forth in
this note demonstrate, the insured seeks to block production of the documents. This author submits that over time, primary insurers would pay
closer attention to their underwriting functions and elicit greater care in
assessing potential underlying insureds. Primary insurers would also take
heed when allocating losses to their reinsurers, knowing that documents
pertaining to their decision-making process could ultimately be subject to
discovery.
The flip side to this argument, of course, rests with the increased responsibility of reinsurers to pay claims promptly and avoid dilatory tactics
that would prevent a cedent’s recovery if merited. After all, the insurerreinsurer relationship found its principled roots in one of utmost good faith.
Whereas it is unrealistic to return to a time when a handshake cemented
reinsurance agreements, greater transparency is one way to resurrect this
once congenial and trustworthy relationship.

